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pAbstract
We examine the association between the receipt of vocational rehabilitation (VR)
services and Federal Disability Insurance using a unique panel data source on
persons who applied for assistance from Virginia’s VR program in 2000. Three central
findings emerge: first, VR services are associated with lower rates of participation in
disability insurance programs-a nearly 2 point drop in SSDI receipt and 1 point drop
in SSI receipt. Second, VR service receipt is associated with lower take-up rates of
SSDI/SSI. Finally, among VR applicants on SSDI/SSI, those who receive substantive VR
services are more likely to be employed.
JEL codes: H51, I13, J24
Keywords: Vocational rehabilitation; Disability insuranceI. Introduction
As the enrollment and costs of the Social Security Administration’s Disability Insur-
ance (SSDI) and Supplemental Security Income (SSI) programs have grown over the
past two decades, there has been growing interest in whether vocational rehabilitation
(VR) programs might serve to reduce the number of persons receiving federal disability
insurance benefits (e.g., Autor and Duggan 2010; Stapleton and Martin 2012). Disability
insurance programs provide cash assistance to people with determinable and significant
work disabilities. By contrast, the public-sector Vocational Rehabilitation (VR) program,
a $3 billion federal-state partnership, is designed to provide employment-related assist-
ance to persons with a broad spectrum of disabling conditions. As the nation’s primary
employment support program for people with disabilities, state VR agencies seem well-
positioned to assist people with disabilities in securing gainful employment rather than
receiving SSDI/SSI (Stapleton and Martin 2012). Yet, while found to play an important
role in helping persons with disabilities to engage in the labor market (Loprest 2007;
Dean et al. 2013a, 2013b and 2013c), very little is known about whether VR services re-
duce participation in Federal Disability Insurance programs1. If VR services improve
labor market outcomes of potential SSDI/SSI beneficiaries, some clients may choose to
fully participate in the labor market rather than take up SSDI/SSI. Yet, for those with lim-
ited abilities or interest, VR programs may instead serve to help clients understandDean et al.; licensee Springer. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution
icense (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium,
rovided the original work is properly credited.
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take-up (Stapleton and Martin 2012; Dean et al. 2013a).
Using a unique panel data source on all persons who applied for VR services in Virginia
in State Fiscal Year (SFY) 2000, we study the relationship between VR service receipt and
SSDI/SSI receipt. For each applicant, we observe quarterly SSDI/SSI, employment and
earnings data, and VR service receipt data from 1995 to 2010. This rich panel data enable
us to provide important insights into the long-run impact of VR services on receipt of
Federal Disability Insurance. Given that the labor market impacts of VR services are
known to differ by the type of limitation (Dean and Dolan 1991; Baldwin 1999; Dean et al.
1999; Marcotte et al. 2000; Dean et al. 2013a, 2013b and 2013c), we analyze the full popu-
lation as well as subpopulations of clients with a physical impairment, mental illness, or
cognitive impairment2. We also examine SSDI and SSI receipt separately: the two groups
of recipients have very different characteristics, receive different benefit amounts, and face
different earnings incentives. In particular, the non-medical eligibility criteria for SSDI re-
quires a significant work history, SSDI benefits vary with work history, and SSDI benefits
are terminated when a recipients earnings exceed some threshold. In contrast, SSI is
means-tested and SSI benefits are determined using a fairly standard negative income tax
formula with a basic guarantee and 0.50 earnings tax after a small earnings disregard.
After describing the data in Section 2, we proceed in two parts. In Section 3, we con-
sider the association between VR service receipt and participation in SSDI and/or SSI,
specifically examining take-up and exits from the Federal Disability Insurance pro-
grams. In Section 4, we evaluate the association between VR receipt and labor market
outcomes, focusing on clients who received SSDI/SSI prior to applying for VR services.
Finally, in Section 5, we draw conclusions. Three central findings emerge. First, in gen-
eral, VR services are associated with lower rates of participation in disability insurance
programs – a nearly 2 point drop in SSDI receipt and 1 point drop in SSI receipt – but
there is substantial variation across impairment groups. Most notably, for the cognitively
impaired subgroup, VR services are associated with greater SSDI/SSI receipt. Second, VR
receipt is associated with lower rates of entry into SSDI/SSI but also lower rates of exit
from the SSDI roles. Finally, among VR applicants on SSDI/SSI, those who receive sub-
stantive services are more likely to be employed but, on average, earn less per quarter.
While these results may suggest that VR programs can effectively reduce SSDI/SSI
roles for certain subgroups, we caution against drawing this type of causal conclusion
from the evidence presented in this paper. Rather, this analysis is largely descriptive,
and does not formally address the fundamental methodological problem involved in
drawing such inferences from observational data. Specifically, the decision to provide
VR services is not likely to be random, or exogenous, with respect to SSDI/SSI receipt. Se-
lection has been found to be a central problem in addressing the impact of job training
programs in general (LaLonde 1995; Friedlander et al. 1997 and Imbens and Wooldridge
2009), and VR program in particular (Aakvik, Heckman, and Vytlacil, 2005; Stapleton and
Martin 2012 and Dean et al. 2013a, 2013b and 2013c). Hence, the observed associations
evaluated in this paper are likely to reflect, in part, unobserved factors such as the severity
of disabling limitation and general health status which are likely to be jointly associated
with VR service and SSDI/SSI receipt. Likewise, the Social Security Administration’s cost-
sharing arrangement with VR agencies for services provided to certain SSDI/SSI benefi-
ciaries further confounds causal inference (see Stapleton and Martin 2012).
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The data used for this analysis come from three different administrative sources. Our
starting point is the administrative records of the Virginia Department for Aging and
Rehabilitative Services (DARS) on individuals who applied for VR services for the first
time in SFY 2000 (July 1, 1999 - June 30, 2000). We limit the sample to 6,732 first-time
applicants between the ages of 21 and 55 at the quarter of application3. For each re-
spondent, we observe an indicator for whether they received substantive VR services,
which we refer to as “treated” applicants4. In addition to observing whether or not the
client received VR services, we observe a range of demographic variables as well as in-
dicators for whether the client had a physical (PI), mental (MI), or cognitive impair-
ment (CI)5. Variables from the DARS records are measured at the time of a clients
most recent application for VR services, and thus do not vary over the estimation time
frame. We then merge these DARS records with quarterly administrative records on
labor market activity from the Virginia Employment Commission (VEC)6 and monthly
administrative records of the Social Security Administration (SSA) on Social Security
Disability Insurance (SSDI) and Supplemental Security Income (SSI) benefit receipt
from 1995 (quarter 2) to 2009 (quarter 4)7. Thus, for each DARS applicant, we observe
quarterly employment, earnings, and disability insurance receipt for many years before
and after the application quarter in SFY 2000.Summary statistics
Table 1 displays the means and standard deviations of the variables for the full sample,
for the treatment groups, and for three impairment groups. Of the 6,732 first-time
DARS applicants, 61% are provided VR services. The treatment rate is similar for cli-
ents in the PI and MI subsamples but much larger for the CI subsample where just
over three-fourths of clients with cognitive impairments are provided with substantial
VR services.
For each applicant, we observe indicators of disability insurance and labor market
outcomes over the fifty-eight quarter period from 1995 through 2009. Over this period,
applicants received disability insurance in 27% of the quarters, were employed in 38%
of the quarters, and, on average, earned $1,371 per quarter. There is interesting vari-
ation in these averages across the treatment and impairment groups. For example, the
rate of disability insurance receipt varies across the three impairment subgroups, espe-
cially SSI receipt which is 9% for the PI, 16% for the MI, and 35% for the CI. Presum-
ably, this reflects the fact that SSI is means-tested and, as observed in Table 1,
employment rates and average earnings are highest for clients with physical impair-
ments and lowest for those with cognitive impairments. Finally, treated clients have
higher employment rates and average earnings than untreated clients.
Table 1 also provides summary statistics for the demographic variables which include
measures of gender, race, education, age, marital status, and number of dependents, as
well as measures of transportation availability and participation in Medicaid8. Relative
to a random sample of US adults, DARS clients are more likely to be black (33%), less
likely to graduate from high school (42%), less likely to be married (18%), and less likely
to have access to transportation. There are only minor differences in the average char-
acteristics of treated and untreated clients9. As might be expected, there are large
Table 1 Means and standard deviations by treatment status and impairment
Full Sample Impairmenta













Treat 0.61 0.49 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.60 0.49 0.61 0.49 0.76 0.43
SSDI or SSIb 0.27 0.45 0.28 0.45 0.27 0.44 0.28 0.45 0.37 0.48 0.48 0.50
SSI 0.14 0.35 0.14 0.35 0.14 0.34 0.09 0.29 0.16 0.37 0.35 0.48
SSDI 0.17 0.38 0.17 0.38 0.17 0.37 0.22 0.41 0.26 0.44 0.21 0.41
Employed 0.38 0.49 0.40 0.49 0.35 0.48 0.40 0.49 0.35 0.48 0.32 0.47
Earnings 1371 3001 1436 2712 1268 3411 1608 3728 1219 2586 770 1786
Age 31 12 31 12 31 12 39 9 37 9 25 9
Male 0.52 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.53 0.50 0.47 0.50 0.40 0.49 0.51 0.50
White 0.66 0.47 0.65 0.48 0.67 0.47 0.65 0.48 0.71 0.45 0.55 0.50
Black 0.33 0.47 0.34 0.47 0.31 0.46 0.33 0.47 0.28 0.45 0.42 0.49
Married 0.18 0.39 0.17 0.37 0.21 0.41 0.37 0.48 0.18 0.38 0.04 0.19
High school 0.42 0.49 0.49 0.50 0.30 0.46 0.57 0.50 0.61 0.49 0.17 0.38
Educ. missing 0.15 0.36 0.00 0.00 0.39 0.49 0.17 0.38 0.14 0.35 0.05 0.22
Special educ 0.09 0.28 0.12 0.32 0.04 0.20 0.02 0.12 0.02 0.14 0.33 0.47
Family size 2.8 1.6 2.8 1.6 2.7 1.6 2.4 1.4 2.1 1.5 3.2 1.8
# Dependents 0.66 1.12 0.61 1.08 0.74 1.18 1.08 1.27 0.84 1.19 0.37 0.93
Transportation 0.71 0.45 0.71 0.46 0.73 0.44 0.82 0.38 0.74 0.44 0.46 0.50
Driver’s license 0.60 0.49 0.59 0.49 0.61 0.49 0.79 0.41 0.68 0.46 0.17 0.38
Medicaid 0.17 0.37 0.16 0.37 0.18 0.38 0.14 0.35 0.18 0.39 0.29 0.45
PI 0.33 0.47 0.32 0.47 0.33 0.47 1.00 0.00 0.19 0.39 0.06 0.23
MI 0.22 0.41 0.22 0.41 0.22 0.41 0.13 0.33 1.00 0.00 0.11 0.31
CI 0.15 0.35 0.18 0.39 0.09 0.29 0.03 0.16 0.07 0.26 1.00 0.00
N 6732 4139 2593 2192 1479 992
Note:
a. The impairment groups are not mutually exclusive or exhaustive. For example, there is no separate group for clients
with learning disabilities.
Also, for the subgroup analysis, the PI and MI subsamples are restricted to clients age 21 and older. The CI sample
includes clients 17 and older.
b. Moments for the disability insurance receipt and labor market variables are based on all person-quarters in samples.
Moments for the demographic and impairment variables are based on information available in the application quarter.
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ample, the high school graduation rate for the cognitively impaired subgroup is 17%,
while the rates for the physically and mentally impaired subgroups are around 60%.Variation in SSDI/SSI receipt over time
Figures 1A-C display the quarterly disability insurance receipt rates measured relative
to the VR application date. Thus, period 0 is the quarter of application in SFY 2000,
period −4 is one year prior to application, and period 4 is one year post-application.
Figure 1A displays the rates of receipt of SSDI/SSI for all 6,732 cases. The rate of SSDI
receipt monotonically increases over this 15-year period from a low of around 6% to a
high of 26%. In contrast, the SSI receipt rate slowly increases (from around 10% to
17%) prior to the application quarter and then remains stable at around 17% thereafter.
Figure 1 Federal Disability Insurance Receipt Rates by Quarter. (A) SSDI/SSI Receipt Rates. (B) SSDI
Receipt Rates by Impairment. (C) SSI Receipt Rate by Impairment.
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the analogous information for SSI receipt. While the rate of SSDI receipt monotonically
increases over time for the three impairment groups examined in this study, the patterns
of change differ. For those with cognitive impairments, the SSDI receipt rate barely
changes prior to the VR application, after which the rate increases rather quickly. For
those with mental and physical impairments, the rates of SSDI receipt increase steadily
over time except for a sharp discrete jump in the SSDI utilization rate for the PI sub-
sample beginning in quarter zero, the VR application quarter. The sharp jump in the SSDI
rate among the physically impaired subgroup is consistent with the sudden and unex-
pected onset associated with some physical impairments10. Workers who suddenly suffer
serious physical impairments, for example, may become jointly eligible for VR and SSDI.
The time series patterns of SSI receipt are different (see Figure 1C) in part reflecting the
differences in the nonmedical eligibility criteria between the two programs; for the most
part, SSDI requires significant work history, while SSI is means-tested. For the MI and PI
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remain fixed thereafter. Notably, there is no discrete jump in participation rates in the period
of application. For the cognitively impaired group, the rates increase from about 30% in
quarter −16 to 40% in quarter 8, and then steadily fall to around 30% in quarter 40. The cog-
nitively impaired are much more likely to be on SSI than other groups of applicants.Earnings and SSDI/SSI receipt
In this section, we provide basic descriptive statistics on the association between earn-
ings and SSDI/SSI receipt. Eligibility for SSDI/SSI benefits requires a person must be
unable to engage in substantial gainful activity (SGA), defined as earnings at least $700
per month in 2000 and at least $980 in 2009. SSDI beneficiaries lose their benefits if
they engage in SGA for extended periods11.
Table 2 displays the distribution of the person-quarters by earnings and SSDI/SSI receipt
status12. Perhaps what is most striking is the large fraction of observed person-quarters
with no earnings; 62% have zero quarterly earnings and, for those receiving disability insur-
ance (either SSDI or SSI), this “unemployment” rate is 84%. The vast majority of SSDI/SSI
recipients who apply for VR services are not employed. Table 2 also reveals striking differ-
ences in the earnings patterns by SSDI/SSI participation status. As should be the case,
those receiving SSDI/SSI are very unlikely to earn in excess of the SGA threshold. By con-
trast, a relatively large fraction of those not receiving disability insurance earn in excess of
this threshold. Finally, these patterns are common across the impairment groups.
To further explore the relationship between earnings and SSDI/SSI receipt, Figure 2 dis-
plays the distribution of person-quarters by the difference in quarterly earnings and the
appropriate quarterly SGA level. To focus on the key earnings levels, we restrict the sam-
ple person with positive quarterly earnings (>$100) that lie between [−$2000, +$2000] of
the quarterly SGA threshold. Figure 2A displays the results by SSDI receipt status and
Figure 2B by SSI receipt status. Two distinct patterns are revealed in these figures. First,
among non-SSDI/SSI recipients, earnings are evenly distributed relative to the SGA level.
That is, earnings are not sensitive to the SGA threshold. Second, among SSDI/SSI recipi-
ents, the fraction of person-quarters decreases with earnings13.Table 2 Earnings relative to SGA by SSDI/SSI receipt
Impairment Subgroups
ALL PI MI CI
Person
qtrs
% of total Person
qtrs
% of total Person
qtrs




No DI 152309 0.390 45690 0.359 28853 0.336 17366 0.302
DI 89429 0.229 31143 0.245 26513 0.309 21873 0.380
Earnings≤ SGA
No DI 46778 0.120 12409 0.098 8823 0.103 5821 0.101
DI 14198 0.036 3113 0.024 4376 0.051 5282 0.092
Earnings > SGA
No DI 84537 0.217 33754 0.266 16121 0.188 6521 0.113
DI 3205 0.008 1007 0.008 1096 0.013 673 0.012
Total 390456 1.000 127116 1.000 85782 1.000 57536 1.000
Note: SGA is the quarterly substantial gainful activity level determined by the SSA.
Figure 2 Distribution of VR Applicants (person-quarters) by Earnings – SGA. (A) SSDI Recipients and
Non-Recipients. (B) SSI Recipients and Non-Recipients.
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the SGA threshold in order to maximize earnings without losing benefits (e.g., GAO
General Accountability Office 2002 and Schimmel et al. 2011), a behavioral phenomena
referred to as “parking.” If true, one might expect the distribution of SSDI recipients to
spike upwards when earnings approach the SGA thresholds. For VR applicants, how-
ever, we find no evidence that SSDI recipients are parking. In fact, there is little evi-
dence of substantial parking in the general population of SSDI/SSI recipients (GAO
General Accountability Office 2002; Schimmel et al. 2011).III. VR services and SSDI/SSI receipt
There is ongoing interest in whether VR programs might reduce the number of persons re-
ceiving disability benefits (e.g., see Hennessey and Muller 1995; Autor and Duggan 2010;
Stapleton and Martin 2012; Sosulski et al. 2012; Dean et al. 2013a). In this section, we
examine the relationship between VR and SSDI/SSI receipt. We begin by displaying the
time series patterns of SSDI/SSI receipt by VR treatment status and then report results
from a number of different linear regressions that allow us to formally account for pre-
application factors as well as the observed covariates listed in Table 1. Finally, we extend the
analysis to focus on whether VR services might be associated with SSDI/SSI entry or exit.VR treatment and SSDI/SSI receipt
Figures 3, 4 and 5 display the time series patterns of quarterly SSDI/SSI receipt rates by
VR treatment status where quarters are measured relative to the application date in
SFY 2000. Figure 3 displays the time series of SSDI or SSI receipt, Figure 4 focuses on
Figure 3 Fraction of VR Applicants Receiving SSDI/SSI by Quarter. (A) Full Sample. (B) PI Subsample.
(C) MI Subsample. (D) CI Subsample.
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one for the full sample and one for each of the three impairment groups identified in
this analysis (PI, MI, and CI).
A few general patterns are observed in these figures. First, for the full sample as well
as the MI and PI subsamples, disability insurance participation rates for the treatment
group increase at a slower rate than in the control group. Consider, for example, the re-
sults for the physically impaired subsample displayed in Figure 3B. One year prior to
the application quarter, the SSDI/SSI receipt rates equal 15% for both the treated and
untreated. One year after the application, the SSDI/SSI rate is 26% for the treated group
and 32% for untreated. This six point difference between the treated and untreated lasts
for nearly ten years. Thus, in this case, VR services appear to be negatively associated
with SSDI/SSI receipt. Second, for the cognitively impaired subgroup, these patterns
are reversed; SSDI/SSI receipt increases at a slightly faster rate for the treated,Figure 4 Fraction of VR Applicants Receiving SSDI by Quarter. (A) Full Sample. (B) PI Subsample. (C)
MI Subsample. (D) CI Subsample.
Figure 5 Fraction of VR Applicants Receiving SSI by Quarter. (A) Full Sample. (B) PI Subsample. (C) MI
Subsample. (D) CI Subsample.
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patterns are somewhat more complex when examining SSI receipt alone (see Figure 5).
For the full sample as well as the MI and CI subsamples, SSI receipt rates for the treated
increase until about eight quarters post-application, and then consistently fall over the
remaining periods. For the PI subsample, SSI receipt rates monotonically increase at
about the same rate in the treatment and control groups.Regression analysis of SSDI/SSI receipt on VR services
A linear regression model allows us to more systematically explore the association be-
tween VR and SSDI/SSI receipt rates by controlling for pre-application SSDI/SSI re-
ceipt as well as the covariates listed in Table 1.
Table 3 displays the results from a series of linear regressions of SSDI/SSI receipt on the
VR treatment status indicator with and without covariates. The first columns display coef-
ficient estimates and the estimated standard errors from a regression on the post-
application quarters; this model does not use the pre-application information. For all
DARS clients, the regression estimates imply a small negative association between SSDI/
SSI receipt and VR services, but these results masks meaningful heterogeneity across im-
pairment groups and disability insurance programs. The physically impaired subsample,
for example, has a large negative association (−0.090) between SSDI receipt and VR but a
much smaller and statistically insignificant (−0.002) association with SSI receipt. For the
MI subsample, there is a small and statistically insignificant association between VR and
SSDI receipt yet a large negative association (−0.032) for SSI receipt. Finally, for the cogni-
tively impaired subsample, there is a large positive association between SSDI receipt and
VR services and a smaller negative association for SSI receipt. In general, these results
suggests VR services are negatively associated with SSDI and SSI receipt for the PI and
MI subsamples but positively associated with SSDI for clients with cognitive impairments.
Thus far, the regression models focus on the post-application quarters. To account
for the pre-application information on the receipt of SSDI/SSI, we estimate a series of
Table 3 Regression of SSDI/SSI receipt on VR treatment indicator: VR treatment
coefficient estimates and estimated standard errors
OLS Individual & time fixed-effects
model
No covariates Covariate No covariates
SSDI or SSI Coef SE Coef SE Coef SE
All −0.003** 0.002 −0.026* 0.002 −0.025* 0.002
PI −0.047* 0.003 −0.093* 0.004 −0.052* 0.003
MI −0.021* 0.004 −0.032* 0.005 −0.050* 0.004
CI 0.096* 0.006 0.047* 0.006 0.019* 0.005
SSDI
All −0.003* 0.002 −0.015* 0.002 −0.017* 0.002
PI −0.046* 0.003 −0.090* 0.004 −0.051* 0.003
MI 0.004 0.004 −0.003 0.004 −0.028* 0.004
CI 0.098* 0.005 0.074* 0.005 0.034* 0.005
SSI
All 0.005* 0.001 −0.008* 0.002 −0.006* 0.001
PI −0.003 0.002 −0.002 0.002 −0.005* 0.002
MI −0.026* 0.003 −0.032* 0.004 −0.024* 0.003
CI 0.026* 0.006 −0.013* 0.006 0.005 0.006
Notes: The full sample is comprised of 265,489 quarterly post-applications observations. The covariates are listed in Table 1.
* = statistically significant at the 5% level; ** = statistically significant at the 10% level.
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an indicator of whether the applicant receives substantial VR services, a flexible quad-
ratic time trend, and individual fixed effects. Time trends are included to account for
the fact that SSDI/SSI receipt is known to change over time, in response to aggregate
economic fluctuations15. The individual fixed effects are incorporated to account for
time invariant factors including health status, skills, and motivation. By comparing the
differences in SSDI/SSI receipt between the treated and untreated, before and after the
application quarter, the fixed-effects regression model provides an elegant way to in-
corporate information from the pre-application data.
The results are displayed in the last two columns of Table 3. Except for the CI sub-
sample, these estimates imply a negative association between VR receipt and both SSDI
and SSI receipt. For example, SSDI receipt rates are estimated to be 5.1 points lower
for physically impaired applicants who receive VR services, and 2.8 points lower for
mentally impaired applicants. The analogous figures for SSI receipt are 0.5 and 2.4
points lower, respectively. For cognitively impaired applicants, VR services are esti-
mated to be positively associated with SSDI receipt (3.4 points higher and significant)
and SSI receipt (0.5 but insignificant). This might happen if, for the subgroup of appli-
cants with cognitive impairments, VR services have little impact on the labor market
but provide clients with basic information about accessing and utilizing the federal dis-
ability insurance system.
Finally, to assess whether the estimated relationships vary with time, we estimate
these individual fixed-effects regression models restricting the outcome to measure
SSDI/SSI receipt at varying quarters post-application. Figure 6 displays the results from
five different regressions that restrict the outcome to measures SSDI/SSI receipt one
Figure 6 Estimates of the Association between VR and SSDI/SSI by Quarter Post-Application.
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VR application in SFY2000. When considering SSDI/SSI receipt together, the estimates
are similar across periods, ranging from a low (in absolute value) of around −0.022 to a
high of −0.027. For SSDI receipt, the estimated associations seem to peak at around −0.035
in the first and second year post-application and then drop to almost zero eight years later.
In contrast, for SSI, the estimates are negligible for many years post-application and then,
by the 32nd quarter, are associated with a relatively large 0.015 reduction in SSI receipt.
These results imply fairly stable associations between SSDI/SSI receipt and VR services for
many years after VR service receipt. However, eight or more years post-application, there
appear to be large changes in the estimated relationships.
Overall, the fixed-effects model results imply that the rates of disability insurance re-
ceipt are lower for persons treated by DARS than those untreated. For some cohorts
(e.g., clients with physical impairments and mental illness) the estimated coefficients
are substantial, suggesting that VR receipt is associated with reductions in SSDI rates
in excess of 2 points. In others cases, however, the associations are fairly small and,
for the cognitive impairments subgroup, there is a positive association between VR
and SSDI/SSI receipt. Thus, while overall the results imply a negative association, we
also find a complex and nuanced relationship between VR and disability insurance
receipt that varies by program and by impairment group. Moreover, whether these
results reveal the casual impact of VR is not certain; the estimated models do not ex-
plicitly account for the selection problem. In fact, (Dean et al. 2013a) find that for
clients with mental illnesses, VR receipt moderately increases SSDI/SSI receipt rates.SSDI/SSI entry and exit
VR assistance may serve to impact disability insurance rolls in two distinct ways. For
those receiving disability insurance benefits, VR services may impact the probability of
exiting the rolls. For those not receiving federal disability insurance, VR services may
impact the probability of applying for and receiving SSDI/SSI. That is, VR may impact
the probabilities of exit from and entry into SSDI/SSI.
To explore this idea, we examine the association between VR and SSDI/SSI receipt for
those that did and did not receive SSDI/SSI in the four quarters prior to applying for VR
services. In the four quarters prior to applying for VR services in SFY 2000, 77% of the
6,732 applicants had not received any SSDI/SSI benefits, while 19% received SSDI/SSI
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ively, are fairly substantial. Among the respondents not receiving SSDI/SSI benefits prior
to SFY 2000, almost 30% entered the SSDI/SSI rolls within the ten years after applying for
VR services. Among the respondents receiving SSDI/SSI benefits prior to SFY2000, nearly
40% exited SSDI/SSI in the ten years following the VR application.
For each of these two cohorts, Figure 7 displays the time series patterns of quarterly
SSDI/SSI receipt rates by VR treatment status, where quarters are measured relative to
the application date in SFY 2000. Figure 7A displays the time series for those receiving
SSDI/SSI prior to applying for VR service, and Figure 7B displays the analogous rates
for those not receiving SSDI/SSI prior to applying for VR services. The net exit rates
displayed in Figure 7A are increasing over time (that is, for those receiving payments
prior to application, the fraction of SSD/SSI recipients decreases over time), but at a
faster rate for the untreated. In contrast, Figure 7B shows that the net entry rates
among clients not receiving SSDI/SSI prior to the SFY2000 application are lower for
the treated than the untreated. Thus, it appears that VR services are associated with
lower net entry and net exit rates from SSDI/SSI.
To explore these results in a regression context, we run a series of linear regressions
of SSDI/SSI receipt on VR treatment status and covariates, stratified by whether or not
the client received SSDI/SSI during the four quarters prior to applying for VR in SFY
2000. The results, which are displayed in Table 4 replicate the basic findings from
Figure 7; VR services are associated with a lower probability of exiting and entering
SSDI/SSI. For example, for the physically impaired, VR services are associated with a
1.5% increase in the probability of SSDI/SSI receipt for those who received disability
insurance prior to the SFY2000 application and a 9.0% decrease in the probabilityFigure 7 SSDI/SSI Receipt Rate by Quarter. (A) Clients on SSDI/SSI Prior to VR Application. (B) Clients not
on SSDI/SSI Prior to VR Application.
Table 4 Stratified regression of SSDI/SSI receipt on VR treatment indicator and
covariates: VR treatment coefficient estimates and estimated standard errorsc
Pre-Application SSDI/SSI Receipt
Yesa Nob
SSDI or SSI Coef SE Coef SE
All 0.054* 0.004 −0.044* 0.002
PI 0.015* 0.008 −0.090* 0.004
MI 0.055* 0.006 −0.063* 0.005
CI 0.050* 0.007 −0.038* 0.007
SSDI Coef SE Coef SE
All 0.108* 0.005 −0.037* 0.002
PI 0.025* 0.010 −0.086* 0.004
MI 0.111* 0.009 −0.038* 0.004
CI 0.166* 0.010 0.002 0.004
SSI Coef SE Coef SE
All −0.021* 0.005 −0.009* 0.001
PI 0.058* 0.009 −0.001 0.002
MI −0.033* 0.009 −0.027* 0.003
CI −0.098* 0.010 −0.042* 0.006
Notes: The regressions are stratified by whether the respondent received or did not receive SSDI/SSI in the year prior to
applying for VR services. The coefficient estimates reveal the association between VR and SSDI/SSI receipt. The sample is
comprised of 51,155 quarterly post-applications observations for the subsample of cases receiving SSDI/SSI in the year
prior to VR application and 208,812 observations in the subsample of cases not receiving SSDI/SSI prior to the VR
application. The covariates are listed in Table 1.
a. Respondents receiving DI in all four quarters prior to the VR application (N = 1,266).
b. Respondents not receiving DI in any of the four quarters prior to the VR application (N = 5,163).
c. The regressions include the covariates listed in Table 1.
* = statistically significant at the 5% level.
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quarter.
These basic qualitative findings are replicated when examining SSDI alone. By con-
trast, we find that for SSI receipt the probability of exiting appears to be positively asso-
ciated with VR services. That is, among applicants who receive SSDI/SSI prior to
quarter 0, the rates of post-application SSI receipt are lower for the treated. For ex-
ample, among the cognitively impaired subgroup, VR services are associated with a
9.8% drop in the rate of SSI receipt for those who received SSDI/SSI prior the applica-
tion quarter. Thus, VR services have a mixed association with SSDI receipt but appear
to be consistently associated with lower rates of SSI receipt (i.e., reduced entry and in-
creased exits).VI. VR and employment for SSDI/SSI recipients
The charge to VR programs is to help disabled individuals stay employed, return to
work, or begin new employment. Although a side benefit might be to reduce SSDI/SSI
rolls, VR programs have no explicit charge to do so. In this section, we explore whether
VR programs are associated with higher employment and earnings for clients who are
receiving SSDI/SSI.
Figures 8 and 9 display quarterly employment rates and earnings by the VR treatment
status, where quarters are measured relative to application date. Panel A displays the
Figure 8 Employment Rate by Quarter. (A) Clients on SSDI/SSI Prior to VR Application. (B) Clients not on
SSDI/SSI Prior to VR Application.
Figure 9 Average Earnings for the Employed by Quarter. (A) Clients on SSDI/SSI Prior to VR
Application. (B) Clients not on SSDI/SSI Prior to VR Application.
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to the application date. Panel B displays the time series for clients who did not receive
SSDI/SSI benefits in the year before applying for VR services.
Perhaps the most striking finding is that, prior to the application quarter, employ-
ment rates of the treated and untreated are nearly identical, while, just afterwards, the
treated experience a pronounced increase in employment rates. This spike is especially
striking for clients who received SSDI/SSI in the quarters prior to applying for VR ser-
vices. For example, among applicants receiving SSDI/SSI, the employment rates are
0.15 for both the untreated and treated one year prior to the application quarter. One
year after the application, the analogous employment rates are 0.19 for the untreated
and 0.32 for the treated. About one year after the application, the employment rates for
both the treated and untreated start to decline but a gap between the treated and un-
treated remains nearly fixed for a decade. After ten years, the employment rates are
0.12 for the untreated and 0.19 for the treated.
Figure 9 displays the time series in earnings among the employed. This figure shows
that trends in earnings among the employed are almost identical for both the treated
and the untreated throughout.
The basic results shown in Figures 8 and 9 are further explored using a fixed-effects
regression model of labor market outcomes (i.e., employment or earnings) on the VR
treatment indicator. Table 5 displays the coefficient estimates and standard errors of
the VR treatment for a regression on the full sample as well as on the three impairment
subsamples. For clients receiving SSDI/SSI prior to applying for services, VR is associ-
ated with a 11.7% increase in the employment rate16. For clients not receiving SSDI/
SSI, employment rates are 9.0 points higher for VR beneficiaries. While employment
rates are positively associated with VR services, earnings among the employed are not-
ably lower (about $650 per quarter) among SSDI/SSI recipients. In summary, we find
that, for those receiving SSDI/SSI, VR services are associated with a sharp, substantial,
and sustained increase in employment but a drop in mean earnings among the
employed.Table 5 Individual fixed-effect regression estimates of VR on employment and earnings
(>0) by Pre-VR application SSDI/SSI receipt statusc
Employment Earnings (>0)
Pre SSDI/SSI Pre SSDI/SSI
Yesa Nob Yesa Nob
Coef SE Coef SE Coef SE Coef SE
All 0.117* 0.005 0.090* 0.003 −652* 106 −6 46
PI 0.117* 0.011 0.095* 0.005 −444* 213 −128 105
MI 0.107* 0.010 0.091* 0.007 −1129* 159 55 71
CI 0.052* 0.012 0.058* 0.010 −31 121 22 95
Notes: The coefficient estimates are for the association between VR services and employment or earnings among the
employed. The regressions are stratified by whether the applicant received SSDI/SSI in the year prior to applying for VR
services.
a. Respondents receiving SSDI in all four quarters prior to the VR application (N = 1,266).
b. Respondents not receiving SSDI in any of the four quarters prior to the VR application (N = 5,163).
c. The regressions include the covariates listed in Table 1.
* = statistically significant at the 5% level.
Note: These coefficients are estimated using the individual fixed-effects regression model.
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In this paper, we use a unique panel data set of SFY 2000 applicants to the Virginia VR
program to explore the relationship between VR services and participation in the two
primary Federal Disability Insurance programs, SSDI and SSI. For the most part, we
find compelling and consistent evidence that VR receipt is negatively associated with
SSDI and SSI receipt, a result that holds for the full population of VR clients as well as
subgroups of people with physical and mental impairments. For those with cognitive
impairments, however, VR is positively associated with SSDI/SSI receipt. Interestingly,
we find that VR is negatively associated with both entry and exit from SSDI. Thus, for
clients already receiving disability insurance, VR is associated with a reduced likelihood
of leaving the insurance roles, while for clients not receiving SSDI/SSI, VR appears to
reduce the chances of taking up SSDI benefits. For SSI, VR appears to be associated
with increased exits and reduced entry. Finally, we find that VR services are associated
with higher employment rates but somewhat lower average earnings among the
employed.
As noted above, we caution against using these results to draw causal conclusions
about the impact of VR on SSDI/SSI participation. Although we use some basic regres-
sion techniques to control for observable covariates and fixed effects, these results
should be interpreted as descriptive in nature. A more sophisticated modeling of the se-
lection problem comprises on-going and future research (see Dean et al. 2013a, 2013b,
and 2013c).
Still, the results in this paper provide an important first step in analyzing the data.
The estimated associations suggest that VR may play a role in reducing SSDI/SSI re-
ceipt. At the same time, we see that the underlying relationships are likely to be nu-
anced and complex, varying across different disability insurance programs, types of VR
services provided, and characteristics of the VR applicants.Endnotes
1There are a handful of studies assessing the correlation between VR services
and SSDI/SSI receipt (e.g., Hennessey and Scott Muller 1995; Tremblay et al. 2006;
Rogers et al. 2005; Stapleton and Martin 2012 and Stapleton and Erickson 2004).
These studies, which for the most part do not address the selection problem, tend
to find that SSDI/SSI receipt is negatively associated with VR. More recently, Dean
et al. (2013a) examined SSDI/SSI receipt in a structural model of VR service
provision, employment probability, log earnings if employed, and SSI/DI receipt
for individuals with mental illness. They find that VR service provision moderately
increased SSDI/SSI receipt.
2For our analysis, the cognitive impairment subsample only includes clients with di-
agnosed intellectual disabilities. Those with a learning disability or autism spectrum
disorders are not included in the subsample unless they are also classified as having an
intellectual disability.
3In total, there were 10,322 applicants in SFY2000. To avoid biases associated with
left censoring (e.g., Heckman and Singer 1984) we drop observations where the indi-
vidual’s first service spell was prior to SFY 2000 (2782 observations). We also ex-
clude applicants younger than 17 years (433 observations) or older than 55 years
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program.
4There are number of reasons applicants are labeled by the DARS as untreated. Some
withdraw their application; others are found to be ineligible for VR services because
their disabilities are too severe or not severe enough; and some eligible applicants drop
out of the program before substantial services are provided.
5The limitations groupings are based on the primary or secondary diagnosis listed in
the DARS administrative records when the individual has an open case; this may be the
first case in 2000, or it may be a subsequent case. These three categories are not exclu-
sive or exhaustive. The PI and MI subsamples are restricted to clients age 21 or over at
the time of application. Additional details on these subsamples are provided by (Dean
et al. 2013a, 2013b and 2013c).
6VEC records do not cover all employment, for example, it does not include persons
who were self-employed, worked out of state, were federal employers, or worked at
contingent-type jobs that do not provide benefits. A comparison by the authors of re-
ported earnings to VEC versus the SSA indicates that about twelve percent of individ-
uals in this cohort show earnings in SSA but not VEC in 2001. (see Dean et al. 2013a,
for further details).
7A Memorandum of Agreement between the SSA and the Virginia DARS allowed us
to obtain monthly SSI and SSDI payments for individuals in our sample through a pro-
cedure that prevents us from identifying individuals in the sample.
8Education information is missing for 15.0% of the sample. Rather than exclude such
observations, we code the high school graduation and special education indicators as
zero and included a dummy variable for when education information.
9The large differences in the rates of high school graduation and receipt of special
education are highly influenced by the treatment of the cases with missing education
information. This will be accounted for in the regression models by using the indicator
for whether education is missing.
10Dean et al. 2013c, discuss and illustrate the importance of modeling this feature of
physical impairments in models of VR take-up.
11Some SSDI beneficiaries are allowed to engage in SGA for limited periods without
benefit loss (see Stapleton and Martin (2012) for details). SSI benefits are based on a
basic negative income tax formula where, after a modest earnings disregard, each add-
itional dollar in earnings reduces benefits by fifty cents.
12The qualitative findings are similar when SSDI and SSI receipt are disaggregated.
13These general patterns are replicated across the three impairment subgroups as well
as for other subgroups of VR applicants (e.g., new SSDI beneficiaries).
14In particular, we estimate the following mean regression model:
E Y T;X ¼ αi þ θT þ f quarter; αq
 
where Y is an indicator for SSDI/SSI receipt, αi is the unknown vector of fixed individ-
ual effects, T is an indicator for whether the respondent received substantial VR ser-
vices, and f(quarter, αq) allows the receipt of SSDI/SSI to vary over time (we use a
quadratic time trend with an indicator for quarters post VR application). We also esti-
mated similar difference-in-difference models. The results are almost identical to the
fixed effects model estimates and thus are not reported in this paper.
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the association between VR and SSDI/SSI to varies over time.
16While we classify an applicant as employed if they have any quarterly earnings, the
results are similar for other earnings thresholds. In particular, when using an indicator
for quarterly earnings in excess of $1500, the resulting coefficients estimates were
somewhat smaller in magnitude but had the same qualitative implications. For example,
the estimate associated with the PI cohort receiving SSDI/SSI prior to VR application
falls from 0.117 to 0.075, both significant at the 5% level.Competing interest
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